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FURTHER LIGHT ON THE PRACTICE OF LAW*
In Alabama
The Legislature of Alabama passed an Act regulating
and defining the practice of law, approved July 20, 1931.
It is interesting to note that the practice of law by indi-
viduals and collection and adjustment agencies and bureaus
in that line of business, is covered by paragraph (d) of Sec-
tion 2 of the Act which reads as follows: "Whoever * * *
(d) As a vocation, enforces, secures, settles, adjusts or compromises
defaulted, controverted or disputed accounts, claims or demands between
persons with neither of whom he is in privity or in the relation of employer
and employee in the ordinary sense; is Practicing Law."
On May 26, 1932, the Supreme Court of Alabama af-
firmed the Circuit Court of Jefferson County in excluding
and prohibiting Bernard Berk, a collection agent, from the
practice of law in the collection business until he has become
a lawyer. (State of Alabama, ex rel, R. Dupont Thompson
vs. Bernard Berk.)
In affirming the judgment the Supreme Court held that
it is the practice of law per se whenever the collection agent
as a vocation solicits for adjustment, collection or compro-
mise of defaulted, controverted or disputed accounts, claims
or demands, he not being at that time an employee in the ordi-
nary sense of the holder of the claim, and in the handling of
such claim the collector threatens suit, collects collection fees
from the debtor, or whenever in his judgment expedient he
turns over to his attorney his claim for prosecution in court.
The Act of the Legislature above referred to is specific in
including the Justice of the Peace Court as a tribunal where
one may not practice law unless licensed so to do.
*By Roy 0. SAMsoN, of the Denver Bar.
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In Washington
Sager Stanley was a resident of Woodland, Cowlitz
County, Washington. He was a notary public and a licensed
and bonded real estate agent and broker. He had
"engaged in the business of drawing various instruments for compensation,
prepared community property agreements for compensation, and in connec-
tion with the preparation of such instruments he advised clients that upon the
death of one of the parties to the agreement the property would accrue to the
other without the necessity of probating the estate. He had drawn wills for
compensation and had been paid for drawing many warranty and quitclaim
deeds. If the clients did not know what kind of a deed they wanted, he
advised them of the different kinds. He prepared claims of lien for others
and gave advice as to the place and time they should be filed and upon whom
and when they should be served. He also drew conditional sales contracts,
informed clients under what conditions the property was being sold and the
respective rights of the parties. He advised clients of the necessity, time and
place of filing chattel mortgages and conditional sales contracts. He drew
other contracts for compensation. He believed he had the right to draw
articles of incorporation and would do it for compensation. He gave legal
advice for nothing."
Stanley was thereafter made defendant in a suit to enjoin
him from practice of law without a license. The superior
court of Cowlitz County found that the conduct of the de-
fendant in so carrying on his business was practicing law, and
enjoined him therefrom.
The decree of the court, however, was without prejudice
to the right of the defendant so long as he remained a duly
authorized Notary Public to take acknowledgments and affi-
davits and to do the necessary scrivener work in connection
therewith and to draw up simple deeds, simple mortgages and
simple contracts and similar simple instruments.
An appeal was taken from that portion of the decree and
the Supreme Court held that in view of the proof that Stanley
was giving legal advice, the trial court erred in holding that
the decree should be without prejudice to his right to draw
simple deeds, simple mortgages, simple contracts and similar
simple instruments and that that portion of the decree from
which appellant had appealed was erroneous and should not
have been embodied therein, and the case was remanded with
instructions to modify the decree in accordance with the




Oklahoma seeks an interpretation of the practice of law
by collection agencies and presents the following situation:
"A corporation was organized as a so-called Credit Exchange, for the
purpose of furnishing its stockholders or members with credit information and
collection service. It secures its business from its members and solicits busi-
ness houses, professional men and others, who have accounts to be collected,
to become stockholders or "members." It does a very large collection business
and, when ordinary methods of collection fail, secures permission from the
creditor to start suit. The suit is started in a municipal court of inferior
jurisdiction by employees who are not lawyers, who file the necessary plead-
ings, and where there is no appearance, take default judgments.
This Credit Exchange retains a firm of attorneys, who furnish it general
advice, attend to its corporate matters, draft forms for it, and attend to the
general legal work that comes up in connection with the operation and conduct
of its business.
If there is an appearance in the cases which the Credit Exchange has
sued, the matter is set for trial and the firm of attorneys is engaged to handle
the contested case and secure judgment. These attorneys bill the exchange
for their services in each case, the amount of which bill is added to the charge
made to the client by the exchange."
The question is presented as to whether the attorneys may
properly accept employment to try these contested cases, or
whether their employment by such a lay intermediary, who
solicits business for itself (and, indirectly, for these lawyers)
is prohibited by Canon 35. It is argued that the lawyers are
not assisting the Credit Exchange to practice law, because it
is contended that the work done by the credit exchanges and
its lay employees, in preparing the pleadings, filing suit, etc.,
in the municipal court, is not practicing law. In support of
this position it refers to an opinion of the attorney-general of
the state, who holds that one may practice in the municipal
court in question without being a duly licensed attorney,
though that opinion admits that the question had not been
directly passed upon by the supreme court of the state.
A lawyer is rendering professional services, when he tries
an -action in a court of law irrespective of whether or not the
statutory law governing that particular court prohibits any
one, other than lawyers and litigants, from conducting such
trials.
The conduct described in the question states a clear case
of the professional services of a lawyer being controlled and
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exploited by a lay agency and such conduct is contrary to
Canon 35. The express exemption from condemnation in
Canon 35 of "The established custom of receiving commercial
collections through a lay agency" has no application since an
actual trial in a "court of law" is not a "commercial collec-
tion," even though the subject matter of such trial may be the
same as that of an attempted commercial collection.
In addition the committee is of the opinion that the insti-
tution of suits on behalf of others in any court of law is "prac-
ticing law," irrespective of whether the statutory law govern-
ing that particular court prohibits the institution of such suits
by persons other than lawyers or not. Lawyers should not aid
or participate in any way in the practice of law by laymen or
lay agencies, nor should they in any way sanction the same or
profit therefrom. The conduct described in the question is
improper, for the attorneys, by their actions, are fostering the
practice of law by a lay agency, as well as aiding therein and
profiting therefrom.
(From opinions of Committee of American Bar Associa-
tion on Professional Ethics: Okla. State Bar Journal, June,
1932.)
In Massachusetts-Judiciary vs. Legislative Control
On March 29, 1932, the Massachusetts State Senate sub-
mitted to the Supreme Judicial Court of that state certain
questions relating to a bill dealing with the admission of per-
sons to practice law. In answer to the Senate the court stated
among other things:
"There is nothing in the Constitution, either in terms or by implication, to
indicate an intent that the power of the judiciary over the admission of persons
to become attorneys is subject to legislative control. . . . The inherent juris-
diction of the judicial department over attorneys, although recognized by
statute, is nevertheless inherent and exists without a statute. . . . Numerous
statutes have been passed making provision in aid of the judicial department
in reaching a proper selection of those qualified for ad mission as attorneys to
practice in the courts. . . . They have been enacted to enable the courts to
perform their duties. They have been enacted, also, in the exercise of the
police power to protect the public from those lacking in ability, falling short
in learning, or deficient in moral qualities, and thus incapable of maintaining
the high standard of conduct justly to be expected of members of the bar. . ..
Statutes respecting admissions to the bar, which afford appropriate instrumen-
talities for the ascertainment of qualifications of applicants, are no encroach-
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ment on the judicial department. They are convenient, if not essential ...
When and so far as statutes specify qualifications and accomplishments, they
will be regarded as fixing the minimum and not as setting bounds beyond
which the judicial department cannot go ... 1'
In Colorado
"It is elementary that a corporation can only appear by an attorney. A
corporation is incapable of personal appearance. . .. A wise public policy
has uniformly maintained these or similar statutory provisions regulating the
practice of law for the protection of citizens and litigants in the administration
of justice, against the mistakes of the ignorant, on the one hand, and the
machinations of unscrupulous persons, on the other, and as long as these
salutary provisions remain as the law of the state for our guidance, we cannot
allow an action to be commenced and prosecuted through the courts by one
who is denied the privilege of an attorney and counselor at law." (Bennie
vs. Triangle Ranch Company, 73 Colorado @ 588.)
It is the opinion of the writer, however, that in all of
these collection agency situations, where the attorney is a sal-
aried employee of the agency, it is not possible to reach a point
where the attorney can divest himself of his relation of paid
employee and assume his character of the disinterested attor-
ney and counselor. The agency practices law when it pays
an employee to perform legal services on its behalf and for
its direct pecuniary benefit, and the role of paid employee or
agent cannot be discarded as a matter of convenience.
In General
A recent publication by Frederick C. Hicks, Professor
of Law, Yale University, "Organization and Ethics of Bench
and Bar," contains a very complete resume of cases dealing
with the unauthorized practice of law. More than twenty-
five pages are devoted to the subject and reference is made
to cases in California, New York, Tennessee, Georgia and
Illinois, with a great number of additional cases cited.
Make the most of yourself, for that is all there is of you.-Emerson.
The function of culture is not merely to train the powers of enjoyment,
but first and supremely for helpful service.-Bishop Potter.
Be a life long or short, its completeness depends on what it was lived
for.-David Starr Jordan.
July 20, 1932.
Mr. Hamlet J. Barry,
Chairman of the Special Committee of the Denver Bar




My dear Mr. Barry:-
Your letter under date of March 30, 1932, addressed to
me, was duly received and contents noted, together with the
report of your special committee, consisting of Kenneth
Robinson, Carle Whitehead, Bentley McMullin, Louis A.
Hellerstein and yourself, as Chairman, also the minority
report signed by Carle Whitehead.
The said report was presented by me to the next meeting
of the Judges en banc, considered and discussed at some
length, and the matter was held over for further consideration.
I further call your attention to the fact that the articles re-
ferred to under paragraph 5(c) by Carle Whitehead, Esq.,
in collaboration with Albert L. Vogl, Esq., appearing in the
January issue of "Dicta" on page 76, and also the article by
Hudson Moore of the Denver Bar, appearing in the March
issue of "Dicta" on page 129, were also considered and the
matter came on for further consideration before the Court en
banc on the 14th day of April, 1932.
I wish to express to you and each member of the Com-
mittee, also to Mr. Albert L. Vogl and Mr. Hudson Moore,
the appreciation of the Court for your manifest and pains-
taking care in preparing this report and these articles, which
have been carefully considered and given the attention they
deserve. However, after consideration of the subject, the
Court en banc was unanimously of the opinion that the prac-
tice as laid down by our Code of Civil Procedure and the
Rules of Practice of the District Court of this district, as
heretofore printed and revised to date, are better-all things
considered-than the changes suggested.
Among the reasons spoken of by one or more of the
Judges, are as follows:
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1. In our opinion, there is no needless delay at the pres-
ent time in civil trials resulting from the filing of successive
motions and demurrers. Such motions and demurrers can be
promptly noticed for hearing and heard with the result that
notwithstanding the great majority of them are overruled as
not well taken, but nevertheless, the argument, discussion and
citation of authority usually results in a better understanding
of the case by Court and counsel.
2. The point should not be overlooked that some reason-
able delay in getting to issue is not, on the whole, time lost as
it gives litigants an opportunity to consult with their respec-
tive counsel, and through them, with each other, with the re-
sult that, on the whole, the records of the Court show that
many times as many cases are settled amicably and compro-
mised after suit has been filed than are actually contested.
3. Referring particularly to the so-called "Single Cal-
endar System" as contrasted with the "Multiple System", as
referred to in Mr. Hudson Moore's said article, it is said
among other things on page 132 that "The stock objection to
the Single Calendar System is that a judge who hears, a motion
or demurrer is best qualified to try all issues in the case". The
consensus of opinion of the Court en banc was that that objec-
tion as applied to this Court under present conditions is well
taken.
4. In connection with the foregoing, it may be that the
"Single Calendar System" may work very satisfactorily in
some jurisdictions where they have a greater volume of busi-
ness, and a greater number of judges, such as Chicago, Illinois
or Los Angeles, California, but we understand from hearsay,
through attorneys and other information, that those courts
that operate under this "Single Calendar System" are much
farther behind with the dispatch of their business relatively,
than this Court.
5. We are unanimously of the opinion, after checking
ov.er our dockets and records of the Clerk's Office, that there
is no "needless delay" in getting cases at issue and trial where
the attorneys in the cases avail themselves of their right and
privilege to promptly move for the setting and hearing of
each motion and demurrer as soon as it is filed, and promptly
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moving for setting the case for trial to court or jury as soon
as the case is at issue.
6. Among the objections considered by the Judges en
banc to the "Single Calendar System" is the fact that that
would entirely eradicate and change our system of assigning
of cases to different Divisions in open Court by lot, as pro-
vided by Rule 2 of the Court Rules, which in our opinioly is
working very satisfactorily, both to Court and counsel.
Respectfully submitted,
GEO. F. DUNKLEE,
Presiding Judge of the
District Court.
AN APOLOGY
Dicta regrets that in the last issue the author of the article
entitled "New Provisions of the Revenue Act of 1932 Relative
to Federal Income Taxes" was noted as "Arthur J. Lindsay"
instead of "Alexander J. Lindsay," who was the writer of the
same.
DICTA DISSERTATIONS
Our destiny is our own and it must be worked out-perhaps in fear and
trembling-in our own way. If there be a cherished American doctrine the
controlling question must be: Is it right? If yea, then let us stand by it like
men; if nay, have done with it and move forward to other issues.-William
McKinley.
Let us not concern ourselves about how other men will do their duties,
but concern ourselves about how we shall do ours.-Lyman Abbott.
However good you may be you have faults; however dull you may be
you can find out what some of them are, and however slight they may be you
had better make some-not too painful, but patient efforts to get rid of
them.-Ruskin.
You are either a magnet that attracts all things bright, desirable, healthy
and joyous--or one that draws all things disagreeable, gloomy, unhealthy and
destructive.-Quigley.
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THE LAW OF THE VETERAN
By John C. Vivian of the Denver Bar
ENEFITS to veterans of the World war and other wars
have grown so rapidly with the continual enactment of
legislation by a beneficent government that many of the
former defenders of the nation are even now unapprised of the
advantages which accrue to them because of their military
service.
More progress has been made in behalf of those men and
women who participated in the World war than the veterans
of other wars because the demands of the last conflict were
greater than ever before.
COMPENSATION
Compensation is available to those men and women who
served between April 6, 1917 (the date of our entry into the
war) and July 2, 1921, when the hostilities were officially de-
clared at an end. It is payable for disability occurring in the
service between the aforesaid dates. It is also available to a
soldier suffering a disability prior to April 6, 1917, provided
he was in continuous service following that date.
Compensation is also payable where a beneficiary suffers
any injury or an aggravation thereof as a result of hospitali-
zation or medical or surgical treatment lawfully awarded by
the administration and not the result of his own wilful mis-
conduct, provided, however, such cases may be compensated
in the event that the veteran has become helpless or bedridden
as a result of such disability. Should death result, service
connection will be granted and dependency compensation paid
to those entitled to it. Application for the latter must be made
within two years after the injury or aggravation was suffered
or death occurred or after June 7, 1924, whichever is the later
date.
Another requirement is that the applicant must have been
honorably discharged from the military establishment.
The disease must have been incurred in, traceable to or
aggravated by military service resulting in physical or mental




Veterans of any war, military expedition or occupation,
including women who served as contract nurses, between April
21, 1898, and February 2, 1901, are eligible under the law for
hospitalization and reimbursement of burial expense.
All such claims are handled by the several regional offices
of the Veterans' Administration, at least one of which is
located in each state.
Hospitalization is furnished by the government gratis, to
all World war veterans who are suffering from service con-
nected disabilities.
Veterans of any war not dishonorably discharged are en-
titled to hospitalization in government institutions, provided
facilities are available.
Allied veterans are entitled to treatment in hospitals only
for service disabilities on prior authority from the government
concerned, under treaty arrangement.
Non-service connected cases which are financially unable
to clothe themselves while in hospitals are furnished the neces-
sary garments by the Veterans' Bureau.
Service connected disabilities may receive treatment by
designated examiners in the neighborhood of their homes when
necessary. Out patient treatment is also provided in regional
offices.
Hospitalization is obtained by direct application to the
regional office having jurisdiction in both service and non-
service connected cases. The request should be made by the
veteran supported with a doctor's statement showing what dis-
ease or injury he is suffering from and describing his condi-
tion in definite terms. Forms for this purpose are available
at the regional office.
There is no authority under the law for the treatment of
non-service connected disabilities outside of government hos-
pitals except for women veterans. If an emergency exists, the
veteran or his physician, or both, should telephone the chief
medical officer and give him all the facts. If the case is a
service connected one, the medical officer has ample authority
to arrange for immediate care. If the condition is not service
connected, this officer is limited to such government facilities
as are available. As long as there is a shortage of hospital
292
DICTA
beds, which is the situation at present, the immediate care of
non-service connected cases is practically an impossibility.
The government will pay transportation expenses from
the home of the veteran to the nearest hospital when previously
authorized by the Veterans' Bureau. The law permits the
administration to reimburse the veteran for unauthorized
medical treatment only in those cases where the disability is
service connected and an emergency existed.
It should be borne in mind that the veteran should not
present himself directly to a government hospital but should
follow the procedure outlined above. Authority from the
Veterans' Bureau for hospitalization as well as traveling ex-
penses must positively be secured from the Regional Office
before the veteran starts on his journey to the hospital.
PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS
The law confers upon the administration the right to
examine or re-examine a government beneficiary at such time
or place as may be reasonably required. If the veteran neg-
lects, refuses or obstructs such examination, his right to com-
pensation may be suspended during the period of neglect,
refusal or obstruction and any additional disability resulting
from a refusal to accept treatment will not be compensated.
DISABILITY ALLOWANCE
Disability allowance is available to those men of the
World war whose defect is permanent and not attributable
or traceable to the service and not the result of his own wilful
misconduct. It varies in amount from $12.00 a month for a
25 per cent disability to $40.00 a month for a total disability.
It was enacted in order to provide what is virtually a pension
for those men who are disabled, not as a result of service or
who cannot establish service connection.
Any honorably discharged person who entered the service
prior to November 11, 1918, who served 90 days or more dur-
ing the World war and who is entitled to exemption from
payment of income tax for the preceding year and who has a
permanent disability in excess of 25 per cent not the result
of his own wilful misconduct, is eligible for the award.
DICTA
INSURANCE
Government war risk insurance is payable to the bene-
ficiaries of those men who took out policies while they were
in the service or since. This protection is also paid to the
insured if he become permanently and totally disabled, at the
rate of $5.75 per month for every $1,000.00 of insurance
carried.
If the government denies the claim for insurance on
account of total permanent disability or death, suit may be
brought against the United States in the Federal District
Court. No action may be maintained for compensation as
distinguished from insurance.
Suits of this character are of a contingent nature so far as
the attorney's fee is concerned. The latter is allowable up to
10 per cent of the amount recovered in the discretion of the
court. The action may be maintained only after a claim has
been submitted to the administrator of veterans affairs and
denied by him.
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
The veterans administration has complete charge of all
affairs relating to veterans of any and all wars in which the
United States has been engaged. This includes the Veterans
and Pension Bureaus and the National Soldiers Homes. Each
is in charge of an assistant administrator accountable to the
administrator of veterans affairs.
CLAIMS
Briefly, all claims arising out of or after the death of a
veteran are handled by central office in Washington while
those for hospitalization, compensation, disability allowance,
and similar items affecting the disabled, are the concern of the
regional offices with the right of appeal to a board of review,
divided into areas and the administrator's board of appeals
as a final resort. The area board of review office for the West
is located at San Francisco.
When a veteran dies from a service connected disability,
compensation may be paid to his widow, children or depend-
ent parents. Such payments to a widow continue until her
remarriage or death, to a child until it reaches the age of
ILI/4-
DICTA
eighteen or marries and to parents during the period of
dependency.
When a person receiving or who is entitled to receive
compensation or insurance dies, the amount due and accrued
is payable to the estate of deceased. If the sum involved is in
excess of $1,000.00 it is paid to the administrator or executor
thereof. If less than this amount, it is relinquished in accord-
ance with the intestacy law of the state in which the decedent
had his last legal residence.
Disability compensation may be allotted by a beneficiary
of the administration for the benefit of any person entitled
thereto when the payee has been hospitalized for treatment by
the government for 60 days or more. Such compensation will
likewise be apportioned under regulations to wives and chil-
dren of estranged parents or those not living together.
ATTENDANT ALLOWANCES
An additional allowance of not to exceed $50.00 a month
may be granted during a period when personal assistance is
needed by the veteran, but not while hospitalized at govern-
ment expense. To secure such allowance it must be shown
that the disabled person needs assistance in dressing, bathing,
keeping in a presentable condition and feeding and protecting
himself from hazards or dangers incident to his daily environ-
ment.
APPLIANCES
The administration will furnish orthopedic and prosthetic
appliances (artificial limbs, braces, etc.) without cost and as
often as necessary in all service connected cases requiring the
same, and non-service connected cases requiring hospitaliza-
tion when the veteran is financially unable to furnish them.
LOSS OF WAGES
Any veteran undergoing physical examination or observa-
tion by the Veterans Bureau may be paid $2.65 per day as a
partial reimbursement for his loss of wages. Total reimburse-
ment, when added to compensation payable, cannot exceed




Funeral and burial expense of $100.00 and an American
flag, are allowed where a veteran dies subsequent to April 6,
1917, provided he is drawing compensation from the govern-
ment. Any veteran of any war not dishonorably discharged
who leaves an estate of less than $1,000.00 is likewise entitled
to this benefit. All postmasters at county seats are authorized
to furnish flags with which to drape the casket.
If death occurs while a beneficiary is ensconced in a
governmental institution, the veteran will be allowed trans-
portation expenses to the place of burial.
Burial may be had in a national cemetery if desired by the
persons entitled to the custody of the body. Application must
be made to the superintendent of national cemeteries, Wash-
ington, D. C., and a certified copy of discharge forwarded.
HEADSTONES
Headstones will be furnished for unmarked graves of
soldiers who served in any branch of the service when appli-
cation is made to the quartermaster general of the Army. They
will be shipped, freight prepaid by the government, to the
nearest railroad station or steamboat landing.
GUARDIANSHIP
Guardianship under state statutes is necessary where the
beneficiary is a minor or mentally incompetent.
INSPECTION OF FILES
All records relating to a claim for insurance or compen-
sation are confidential except to the claimant or his duly
authorized representative and only then as to matters relating
to the veteran himself, provided that such disclosure would
not be detrimental or injurious to his physical and mental
well-being.
Accredited service organization representatives are au-
thorized to review case folders when requested to do so by
claimants.
Development of evidence in the prosecution of claims
is a technical subject and must conform to the law, and the
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rules and regulations promulgated by the veterans adminis-
tration.
DEPENDENCY COMPENSATION
Additional compensation on account of dependents is
payable to a veteran rated as temporary. No additional allow-
ance is made for those on a permanent basis. Widows and
children or dependent parents of a veteran who died of a
service incurred disability are likewise entitled to allowances
on this account.
ADJUSTED COMPENSATION
Adjusted compensation, otherwise known as the bonus, is
available to thousands of veterans who have not applied for
it. Applications may be made until January 2, 1935. The
certificate has a loan value up to 50 per cent of the face value
thereof.
PENSIONS
The director of pensions, under the supervision of the
administrator of veterans affairs, has complete jurisdiction
over adjudication of pension claims.
SOLDIERS HOMES
National homes for disabled volunteer soldiers are now
a part of the veterans administration. Honorably discharged
soldiers, sailors and marines who are disabled and who have
no adequate means of support and who, by reason of such
disability are either temporarily or permanently incapacitated
from earning a living, are entitled to the benefits of these
homes. Eligibility for admission to a Home is determined
at the institution where application is made.
There is but one good fortune to the earnest man. This is opportunity;
and sooner or later, opportunity will come to him who can make use of it.-
David Starr Jordan.
We pass for what we are. Character teaches above our wills. Men
imagine that they communicate their virtue or vice only by overt actions, and
do not see that virtue or vice emit a breath every moment.-Emerson.
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BIG REVIVAL! BIG REVIVAL!!
FOR TWO ISSUES ONLY!!!
In our exhausting search for material, a search by the way that has made
Dictaphun the most widely read column of its kind published in Dicta, we
unearthed a vein of stories of the early and pre-modern Colorado bar. They
were good stories then and still are. We've laughed at some of them in the
face of a thousand renewed tellings. Besides, if you don't like them you don't
have to read them and we have filled our space anyway. That, as a well
known newspaper would and does say, is that.
NO. 1-THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR STORY.
Mitchell Benedict and Judge James F. Welborn constituted the first
board of law examiners for the Second Judicial District, which included
Denver. Judge George Rogers was admitted to practice August 27, 1881,
having successfully undergone this gruelling test of his capabilities:
Mr. Benedict: "What is the legal rate of interest in Colorado; it is
seven per cent per annum, is it not,"
Mr. Rogers: "That is my present information, sir."
Mr. Benedict: "Here is your certificate, young man; take it over to
Judge Welborn and he will sign it also."
NO. 2-A CHARLES S. THOMAS STORY
Joel F. Vaile: "Will the court set the case of Roe v. Denver & Rio
Grande Railroad Co. for trial at the May term?"
Judge Hallett (of sainted memory): "The May docket is now com-
plete, Mr. Vaile."
Mr. Vaile: "Then, might I not have a day in June?"
Judge Hallett: "There will be no days in June."
Charles S. Thomas (aside you may be sure) : What is so rare as a day
in June?"
NO. 3
THE FAMOUS CAN'T SEE YOU JUDGE STORY
The term at Del Norte had opened and all the attorneys except John G.
Taylor had recovered from the night's sojourn at Shaw's Springs.
Judge Hallett (o. s. m.) : "Mr. Taylor, you are intoxicated, sir."
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Mr. Taylor: "Your Honor, I'm all right; I can-"
Judge Hallett: "Mr. Taylor, you are intoxicated, sir; I can't hear
you."
Mr. Taylor: "Thas all right, Judge; you've got nothing on me; I can't
see you."
NO. 4
THE SAME MR. TAYLOR BUT ANOTHER JUDGE
Denver District Court, Peter L. Palmer, Judge, presiding.
The Court: "Sit down, Mr. Taylor."
Mr. Taylor: "If the Court pleases, I must be heard, I-"
The Court: "Sit down, Mr. Taylor, you're drunk."
Mr. Taylor: "Thas the first time I ever knew this court to be right."
NO. 5
THE ONE ABOUT THE JUDGE AND HIS WATCH
Chester C. Carpenter, judge of the First Judicial District, 1881-1886,
was being examined upon proceedings supplementary to execution before Judge
Moses Hallett in United States District Court. The examination, growing
very lengthy, failed to disclose the possession of any property by Carpenter.
Judge Carpenter, growing more and more impatient, took a costly gold watch
from his pocket to see the time. "Whose watch is that?" demanded Hallett.
"Mine," said Judge Carpenter. "Turn that watch over to the Marshall,"
said Hallett. And Carpenter obeyed the order.
NO. 6
HALLETT WAS NEITHER DEAF NOR DUMB
District Court of the United States for the District of Colorado, sitting
at Denver, Moses L. Hallett, Judge, presiding. Present, the usual officers and
the late D. L. Webb, of the Denver bar, Mr. Webb standing near the bar
separating the public from the space reserved for counsel.
Mr. Webb: "If it please the court, may I have an order in the case
of-"
Judge Hallett (speaking gently) : "We cannot hear you, sir."
Mr. Webb (moving to the center of the court room): "MAY I
HAVE AN ORDER IN THE CASE OF-"
Judge Hallett (also speaking louder): "WE CANNOT HEAR
YOU, SIR."
Mr. Webb (at the bench itself and shouting): IF THE COURT
PLEASE, I DESIRE-"
Judge Hallett (with a roar): "WE CANNOT HEAR YOU, SIR.
WE WILL HEAR YOU ON THURSDAY, SIR."
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NO. 7-ANOTHER CHARLES S. THOMAS STORY
(THER'RE MILLIONS)
Scene: United States District Court, sitting in Pueblo, under the guid-
ance of the aforesaid Judge Hallett. Present, among others: Charles S.
Thomas, for plaintiff; John M. Waldron, for Colorado Fuel and Iron Co.,
defendant. Mr. Waldron's voice was powerful and carrying and on occasion
he used it with great vociferousness and effect. Senator Thomas had promised,
it appeared, to produce, and had not produced, Casimiro Barela, of Trinidad,
as a witness.
Mr. Waldron (to the court) : "Where is Casimiro Barela?"
The Court: "I do not know, Sir."
Mr. Waldron (turning to the jury and raising his voice) : "Gentlemen
of the jury, WHERE IS CASIMIRO BARELA?"
The Court: "Ask Mr. Thomas, Sir."
Mr. Waldron (turning to counsel's table, where Senator Thomas is
busily writing, and thundering): "WHERE IS YOUR WITNESS, CASI-
MIRO BARELA?"
Mr. Thomas (without looking up): "He is listening to you, Mr.
Waldron."
Mr. Waldron (looking around the court room): "WHERE?
WHERE, SIR?"
Mr. Thomas: "In Trinidad."
NO. 8-A TWENTY CENT BILL OF EXCEPTIONS
A divorce case of particular flavor was being tried before the late Judge
George W. Allen, and the court had brdered the public excluded. Simon
Taylor Horn, of the Denver bar, knocks at the court room door.
Bailiff: "What can I do for you, Mr. Horn?" Mr. Horn: "I want
to enter the court room." Bailiff: Soory, sir; everyone is excluded; court's
order." Mr. Horn (sees Judge Allen through the door) : If the court
please, may I come in?" Judge Allen: No, sir. Without exception the
public is excluded." Mr. Horn: "Save an exception."
The block of granite which was an obstacle in the pathway of the weak,
becomes a stepping stone in the pathway of the strong.-Carlyle.
It is just as easy to form a good habit as it is a bad one. And it is just
as hard to break a good habit as a bad one. So get the good ones and keep
them.-President McKinley.
A good heart is a letter of credit.-Bulwer.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-NEGLIGENCE oF-EVIDENCE OF-INSTRUC-
TIONS IN-Wold vs. City of Boulder-No. 12705-Decided May 9, 1932
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Verdict of the jury, when based upon disputed evidence, will not
be disturbed unless wrong beyond question.
2. The exclusion of photographs as evidence is not prejudicial, when
they merely tend to show what has already been established by other evidence
beyond question.
3. In a suit against the municipality, to recover damage for falling on
an icy sidewalk, the testimony of a witness for the defendant, that he had
never seen ice formed at the place in question is admissible, when the plain-
tiff's witnesses have already made contrary statements.
4. Municipal corporation is not primarily liable for injuries suffered
by a pedestrian because of a defect on the sidewalk. The liability of a city
arises, if at all, only after it has had reasonable time, after acquiring or being
charged, with knowledge of the defect, to remedy it. An instruction to this
effect is not error. Evidence of absence of complaints concerning such defects
is therefore admissible.
5. An instruction limiting the cause of action to the negligence alleged
in the complaint, is not error.-Judgment affirmed.
MANDAMUS-JURISDICTION OF COURTS TO GRANT-Laizure v. Judge of
County Court of Pueblo County-No. 13094-Decided May 9, 1932-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. When in a divorce action the plaintiff, after obtaining her findings
of fact and conclusions of law, has applied to set them aside and dismiss the
suit and the court refuses to do so; and when after the expiration of six
months, the defendant applies for a decree of divorce and the court has refused
his application, application for a writ of mandamus should be made to the
district court, unless it appears that there is reason to apply to the supreme
court.
2. For purposes of mandamus, the district court is a superior tribunal
to the county court.
3. The mere fact that the county and district courts have jurisdiction
to grant divorces does not prevent the county court from being an inferior
court. The two courts have concurrent jurisdiction only where the plaintiff
seeks alimony in excess of $2,000.00. Under the present system, appeal from
the county to the district court may be had and there is no reason to distinguish
between divorce cases and other cases.-Petition denied.
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STARE DEcIsis-Craddock Estate v. Palmer-No. 13099-Decided May 16,
1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Where, after entry of finding of fact in divorce case, but before
final decree, the wife dies, and the District Court after expiration of six
months entered a final decree finding that cause of action survived and decree-
ing that husband had no right, title or interest in any property left by the
deceased wife and such judgment is affirmed by this court, it became the law
of the case.
2. The husband cannot thereafter attempt to re-litigate such issue by
filing a petition for determination of heirship in County Court and on a
judgment adverse to his alleged right as an heir, sue out writ of error in this
Court and re-litigate the same question by merely bringing a different action.
-Judgment affirmed.
ESTOPPEL-LIABILITY ON BON--In the Matter of the Assignment of Albert
H. Stockham, et al. v. Jack, as Receiver-No. 12898-Decided May 16,
1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Alter.
1. Where the President of a bank signed as surety the bond of the
ckshier of the same bank in 1917, and the Cashier in 1922 was elected Vice
President in which office he remained until 1927 when he was again elected
cashier and between 1922 and 1929 a shortage occurred in his accounts in
excess of the penalty in the bond, and thereafter the President made an
assignment for the benefit of creditors and the bank went into Receivership,
and Receiver filed claim with assignee of President for full penalty of bond,
order allowing claim in full was not error.
2. Where in 1929 the bank examiner, before the bank failed, objected
to the bond and the President assured him it was good and in full force and
effect, the assignee of the President is estopped from setting up the defense
that the bond had expired in 1922 by the Cashier's vacating his office and being
elected Vice President.-Judgment affirmed.
DEEDS-CONVEYANCE FOR SUPPORT DURING LIFE---GROUNDS FOR SET-
TING ASIDE-Potter, et al. v. Coombs, et al.-No. 13079-Decided May
16, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. Where a woman 65 years of age conveys her farm worth $30,000
to her physician and confidential adviser for a consideration of his paying to
her annually during the rest of her life $1,800, she reserving a life estate
therein, and further providing that upon failure to make any required pay-
ments, the doctor should reconvey the property and forfeit as liquidated dam-
ages and as rental, all payments, theretofore made, a failure to make the
annual payment for two successive years or to pay the taxes work a forfeiture
of the deed and a decree providing for payment of the balance due up to the
death of the grantor or for a reconveyance of the real estate, was proper.
2. In such a case it is not necessary to allege or prove fraud.
3. Failure to perform the stipulation for support is a sufficient ground
for setting aside the deed without any showing of fraud.-Judgment affirmed.
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CARRIERS-JURISDICTION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION-COMMON
CARRIERs-Burbridge vs. The Public Utilities Commission-No. 12906--
Decided May 23, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
1. The court below affirmed the findings and order of the Public
Utilities Commission, which found that Burbridge was a motor vehicle, or
common carrier, operating without a certificate of public convenience and
necessity and further ordered him to cease and desist from operating as a
motor vehicle carrier unless he shall have obtained a certificate of public
convenience and necessity.
2. The Statutes of Colorado define motor vehicle carrier as one who,
among other things, indiscriminately accepts, discharges and lays down either
passengers, freight, or express, or who holds himself out for such purpose by
advertising or otherwise.
3. The evidence shows that Burbridge operated four trucks transport-
ing freight between Denver, Greeley, Brighton, and Eaton, under contract,
either oral or written, for six business firms and in addition to this, accepted
freight from numerous shippers upon the request of the six firms that he con-
tracted with, which freight was delivered to the various branches of the said
six firms that he was under contract with.
4. Such evidence fails to show that Burbridge did indiscriminately
accept, discharge, and lay down, freight or that he held himself out for such
purpose by advertising or otherwise.
5. Chapter 134 Session Laws 1927 was not intended to and does not
regulate private motor vehicle carriers for hire. It regulates only common
carriers engaged in the business of transporting by motor vehicle passengers,
freight or express, for hire.
6. Burbridge was not, therefore, a common carrier as defined by the
act.-Judgment reversed.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-LOANS-PRINCIPAL'S
Loss-Hentzell vs. Hildebrand et al.-No. 13072-Decided May 23, 1932
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. Hildebrand obtained a judgment below against Hentzell cancelling
a promissory note and deed of trust. Mitchell, a lawyer, from time to time,
sold secured notes to Hentzell and Hentzell loaned money through Mitchell
as his attorney and agent, Mitchell examining the abstract of title and attend-
ing to the drawing of the papers. As a result, Mitchell became indebted to
Hentzell for $1200.00. Hildebrand applied to Mitchell for a loan of
$3000.00. The land being encumbered by a federal loan of $1800.00,
Mitchell submitted the application to Hentzell, who told Mitchell that he
would make the loan provided the title was all right and that Mitchell would
repay the $1200.00 to Hentzell or pay that amount to the Hildebrands as part
of the loan. The federal loan was to be paid out of the $3000.00. Mitchell
obtained Hildebrands' note for $3000.00 and their deed of trust, and for the
purpose of paying off the federal loan, Hentzell gave Mitchell sufficient,
together with the $1200.00 owing by Mitchell to pay off the federal loan.
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Mitchell did not pay off the loan, converted the money to his own use, and
paid nothing to the Hildebrands.
2. The trial court was right in holding that Mitchell was Hentzell's
agent in the transaction and that under the circumstances above that Hentzell
and not the Hildebrands should bear the loss.
3. Judgment cancelling the note and deed of trust is justified by the'
evidence and the law.-Judgment affirmed.
APPEAL AND ERROR-UNLAWFUL DETAINER-NECESSITY OF DEPOSITING
RENT ON APPEAL-Routen vs. J. & 0. Ranch Company-No. 13087-
Decided May 23, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. In an unlawful detainer action before a justice of the peace, the
J & 0 Ranch Company obtained judgment against Routen for possession of
land. Appeal was taken to the County Court. The two bonds were filed
and J & 0 Ranch Company filed motion to dismiss the appeal because of
Routen's failure to deposit rent, and the appeal was dismissed.
2. Upon an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace in an
unlawful detainer action founded upon non-payment of rent, the statute
requires the defendant to file two bonds and also deposit with the justice of
the peace the amount of rent found due and thereafter, upon appeal, the rent
must be deposited with the Clerk of the appellate court as and when due.
3. Such provision in regard to the deposit of rent is not applicable
where the rent was not payable in money, but was payable in one half of
products from all livestock, including poultry. In such case it cannot be
seriously contended that during the pendency of appeal the tenant should
deliver either to the justice of the peace or the clerk of the appellate court
livestock, poultry, eggs and other products from the rented premises.-Judg-
ment reversed with directions to set aside judgment of dismissal and re-instate
the case on appeal.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-LIABILITY OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL FOR NEGLI-
GENCE, IN HANDLING LOAN-The Colorado Investment and Realty Com-
pany vs. Stubbs-No. 12422-Decided May 23, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Hilliard.
1. Where defendant is engaged in making farm loans and in buying
and selling farm loans and the plaintiff was an investing customer, and in
1922, sold a $5,000. loan to plaintiff, secured by a first deed of trust due in
five years; and where the defendant undertook to handle the collection of
interest and see that the taxes were kept up and where -it appeared that the
maker of the loan defaulted in the interest for several years and defaulted in
the payment of taxes during the entire period and the defendant failed to
inform the plaintiff of these facts, but assured the plaintiff during the period
from 1922 to 1926 that they were attending to the matter and that the pay-
ments were being promptly made of interest and taxes and did not disclose
the true situation to the plaintiff until four years after the loan was made,
at which time the security was so depreciated that the loan was valueless, the
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plaintiff was entitled to recover from the defendant the full principal of the
note and unpaid interest.
2. It is no defense to such an action that at most the defendant's
failure to advise plaintiff promptly of the defaults operated only to postpone
action and that there was no certainty that with knowledge the plaintiff would
have proceeded at once to foreclose or take other steps to protect his interests.
3. From the inception of plaintiff's ownership of the note, defendant
was his agent expressly charged and impliedly required to keep its principal
informed as to any circumstances coming to its knowledge calculated in
reasonable prospect to impair the security for the loan.
4. The question is not what the plaintiff would have done, but rather,
what he could have done had his agent been faithful.
5. The measure of damages was the full face of the note and interest.
Clearly the agent was negligent in matters essentially material; but for the
agent's derelictions, plaintiff would have been in position to protect his in-
vestment. In such circumstances, the amount of the claim is the proper
measure of damages.-Judgment affirmed.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--LIABILITY FOR FALLING ON Icy SIDEWALK-
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-City and County of Denver vs. Hudson-
No. 12664-Decided May 23, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. Plaintiff below had judgment against the city for damages in the
sum of $1650. sustained by falling on an icy and slippery sidewalk. The
defendant urged error in that the evidence of the plaintiff showed as a matter
of law that she was guilty of contributory negligence in going upon an ob-
viously dangerous sidewalk having at the time knowledge of its dangerous
condition and also knowledge of one or more other safe and convenient ways
by which the dangerous condition of the sidewalk on which she slipped and
fell could have been avoided; and that her failure to use the safe way or ways,
of which she knew, and her choice of a way she knew to be unsafe, constituted
the sole and proximate cause of her injuries.
2. If the undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff had knowledge
of the unsafe condition of the sidewalk in question and that the adjoining
street or sidewalk afforded a safe and suitable way for travel, plaintiff might
be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
3. But, where there is testimony by the plaintiff that on the night
previous to the injury several inches of snow had fallen upon and still covered
the sidewalk in question and also the adjacent street and sidewalk which
tended to show that not only the sidewalk on which plaintiff fell, but also
the adjoining street, itself, and the sidewalk on the opposite side of the street
were also in a bad condition by reason of the snow and ice, the plaintiff can-
not be held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in choosing
the particular walk that she traveled on.
4. Reasonable minds might differ as to the question of the plaintiff's
contributory negligence; hence, the trial court was right in submitting this
issue to the jury.-Judgment affirmed.
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SALES-WARRANTY-WAIVER OF WARRANTY-BY EXTENDING NOTE-
Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. vs. Miller-No. 12642-Decided
May 31, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
1. Plaintiff sued on promissory notes. Defendants admitted execution
and delivery, but alleged they were part of purchase price of tractor, which
defendants were induced to purchase through false representations as to its
efficient usability. Alleged failure consideration and in a counter claim re-
covered in the court below the amount of note defendants had previously paid
on the purchase price.
2. Under such circumstances, plaintiff cannot rely upon a provision of
the written contract to purchase providing that all claims for damages by
reason of non-performance of the machinery are waived. The court will not
construe such a contract so as to work a forfeiture of rights except in very
clear cases.
3. The judgment of the court below in favor of the defendant on the
counter claim was grounded on the warranty that the tractor was well made,
of good material and would do as good work as any other machine under
like circumstances. The evidence was clear that the tractor did not comply
with this warranty.
4. The rule that in case of rescission it is the duty of the party to
return the tractor at the place where it was originally delivered does not obtain
where the defendant offered to return the tractor and demanded surrender of
their notes and the defendant refused such offer and demand. Under such
circumstances, actual delivery would be useless and the law does not require
useless or unnecessary things.
5. While ordinarily the renewal of a note after knowledge of defects
in the machine would estop defendants from defending on account of breaches
of warranty, yet in this case, there is no implication of law that the parties
were attempting to adjust past differences or to shut off defenses arising out
of past complaints, but that the transaction is to be understood merely as
extending the time in which each of the parties is to perform his contract.
The plaintiff's breach of warranty was not unconditionally consummated at
the time the renewal note was given, for the reason that the warranty and
the concurrent promise on the part of the plaintiff was not merely that there
would be no defects, but if there were defects, the plaintiff would remedy
them.-Judgment affirmed.
ATTORNEYS - DISBARRMENT - GROUNDS OF - People vs. Warren - No.
12652-Decided May 31, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
1. Where the evidence shows that an attorney makes collections with-
out authority and appropriates the money to his own use, and by false and
fraudulent pretenses, induces one to cash a worthless check for him and gives
check for clothing on a bank where he has no funds, and is later convicted of
forgery, such a series of crimes shows that he is utterly unfit to engage in the
practice of law.
2. In view of the record in this case, respondent is disbarred.
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WILLS - WAIVER OF WIDOW'S ALLOWANCE - Vincent vs. Martin - No.
12763-Decided May 31, 1932- Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
1. Vincent prosecutes error to review order of the County Court dis-
allowing her claim for widow's allowance. It appears that during his lifetime,
Vincent and his wife entered into a contract providing that he would will and
bequeath to his wife the sum of $15,000.00 and all furniture and household
goods and in consideration thereof, she agreed to accept the same in full satis-
faction of any and all rights of dower, statutory allowances and rights of
inheritance as surviving widow. Pursuant to this contract, will was executed
by Vincent with the written approval and acceptance of the terms by the wife.
2. There was no failure of consideration. Neither fraud nor undue
influence was charged or proven.
3. The words used in the contract "statutory allowances" was intended
to and did include the widow's allowance.
4. While the waiver of a widow's allowance must be express, this does
not mean that the words "widow's allowance" must be used in the waiver
where the term used in the waiver clearly comprehends that it includes
"widow's allowance."-Judgment affirmed.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-HOME RULE CITY-POLICE COURT-CREA-
TION oF-The People vs. Pickens-No. 13035--Decided May 31, 1932-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
I.
The power provided by Charter for the Mayor to appoint two Justices
of the Peace, one of whom shall be designated to perform the duties of Police
Magistrate, does not negative the power of the council to create a Municipal
Court. No exclusive jurisdiction is conferred by the Charter, and the power
to so appoint and designate Justices rests upon the same constitutional grant
as the power to create the office here in dispute.
II.
A Municipal Court need not be established by charter provision. It can
be created by ordinance.-Judgment affirmed.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-KNOWLEDGE-RATIFICATION-FINDINGS OF FACT
-Zang Company vs. Reilly-No. 12686-Decided May 31, 1932-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
I.
Assuming that a mere secretary of a corporation is not invested with
authority to enter into contracts of general employment, nevertheless, when
such a secretary assumes to have such power and, to the knowledge of a Board
of Directors of a corporation, exercises it in making such contracts, the con-
tract will be upheld as being that of the principal corporation.
II.
The findings of fact by a jury, when supported by evidence, will be
sustained.-Judgment affirmed.
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BODY JUDGMENTS-LIABILITY OF AUTHORITIES-CAS, OF-GOOD CON-
DUCT APPLIED TO-Hershey, et al, vs. The People ex rel Johnson-No.
13077-Decided May 31, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
I.
One confined under a body execution on a judgment recovered in a
tort action is not "sentenced" for a crime, and the provisions of the statute
allowing prisoners sentenced for crimes time off for good behavior does not
apply in such a case.
II.
Under the common law which applies in Colorado in absence of
statute if an officer who has a prisoner in charge, permits a voluntary or negli-
gent escape the execution creditor may recover the damages actually sus-
tained. The presumption is that the creditor loses the entire debt by such an
escape but the poverty or insolvency of the debtor can be introduced in
mitigation of damages.
III.
Where an officer has in his custody a man confined under a body exe-
cution and releases him under the advice of the Attorney General and the
City Attorney, such a release does not relieve the officer from liability. Under
such circumstances, the escape is deemed a negligent escape.
IV.
Under such circumstances as outlined above, the execution creditor is
entitled to recover whatever damages he has sustained as the result of the
wrongful release. Prima facie the amount of his damage is the amount of his
judgment against the confined debtor. The defending officers are, however,
entitled to prove, if they can, the execution debtor's poverty or insolvency in
mitigation of damages. It is error to exclude such proof.-Judgment reversed
and remanded.
PUBLIC UTILITIES-CITY ORDINANCES AFFECTING-ORDINANCES-INTER-
PRETATION oF--Canon City vs. Kaughman-No. 12688-Decided June
6, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
I.
An ordinance, providing that the right to operate an automobile or
other conveyance for hire in the city in any of the parks, over any roads or
highways owned or controlled by the city shall be licensed and subject to
licenses issued by the City Council, does not affect a vehicle operating under
a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity when it is shown that business was
not solicited or accepted in the city that passed the ordinance.
II.
It is unnecessary to determine as to whether or not a public utility may
be required to procure a license from a municipality under the facts of this
case.-Judgment affirmed.
DICTA
CONTRACTS-FRAUD-INCEPTION OF-RATIFICATION-Duke vs. Cregan-
No. 12601-Decided June 6, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
I.
Plaintiff was induced to purchase an interest in the Sage Transfer and
Storage Company upon representations that the business made certain profits
during several prior years. As a matter of fact, the figures given as profits
included bad debts. In addition to this, the amount shown as having been
paid for rent was inflated considerably over the actual amount paid. A pro-
vision in the contract set out that the purchaser was acting not as the result
of his own investigation but in reliance upon the representations of the sellers.
Where the Court below found that the purchaser actually bought in reliance
upon the representations of the seller and that finding is supported by the
evidence, it will not be disturbed in the higher Court.
II.
A contention that the plaintiff, by accepting his salary from the com-
pany, affirmed the contract is unsound and the plaintiff is not required to
return the salary for it was received from the company and not from the
defendants. The lower Court found that the plaintiff received his salary
before he knew of the falsity of the representations made to him.-Judgment
affirmed.
INSURANCE-LABOR UNIONS-PREMIUMS-EFFECT OF DELINQUENCY IN
PAYING-Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees vs. Nolan-
No. 12505-Decided June 6, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
I.
Where, by a course of dealing, a company or organization, such as the
one in question, has led a member to believe and understand that prompt
payment of assessments will not be required but that they will be accepted
and received after due and that the member will be considered in good stand-
ing notwithstanding the delay in payment, the company will be held to have
waived prompt payment and the member will be deemed to be in good stand-
ing for such reasonable time after an assessment is delinquent as has thereto-
fore customarily keen allowed him in which to pay dues.
II.
Where it is established that an insurance society accepted payment of
premiums after the insured was in default and that it was aware of such
default, a waiver is established.
III.
Where dues or premiums, payable on November 1, were not paid
until November 22, but at that time were received without question, the
company will be deemed to have waived its requirement for prompt pay-
ment.-Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Butler dissenting: The law set down in the majority
opinion is correct but not applicable to the facts in hand. The company here
involved was not an insurance company but a trade union. Its receipts are
not premiums but dues. The dues are paid for membership and, according to
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the by-laws, if they are paid promptly, certain death benefits are payable.
The death benefits are an inducement to prompt payment but are by no means
the sole purpose of the dues. The judgment should be reversed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DURATION OF DISABILITY-Industrial Com-
mission vs. Roper-No. 13003-Decided June 6, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Alter. I.
A finding by the referee for the Industrial Commission, sustained by
a supplemental award of the Commission to the effect that a caimant's disa-
bility has terminated, must be supported by the evidence and, upon an action
in the District Court to set aside an award of the Commission, it is the duty
of the Court to set aside such a finding where the record discloses no sup-
porting testimony. II.
Under rule 2, Rules of Procedure of the Colorado Industrial Com-
mission, the Court determined the duration of the disability. This rule must
be pled. This was not done here.-The judgment of the District Court is
affirmed except as to the finding concerning the duration of disability.
MANDAMUS-POLICE POWER-LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF HOME RULE
CiTIEs-People, ex rel. Hershey vs. Begole-No. 12650--Decided June
20, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. Refusal of the auditor of the City and County of Denver to
approve a demand, on the ground of want of lawful authority to approve it,
amounts to a' refusal to act upon it. Mandamus is the proper remedy to
compel an audit.
2. Act of 1907 (S. L. 1907, c. 112; C. L. c. 29), establishing regis-
tration districts for vital statistics and imposing upon the city or county in
which a registration district is situated, after approval by the auditing official
of such city or county, liability for the compensation of the local registrar, is
a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
3. Article XX of the state constitution imposes no limitation upon
the power of the legislature to control "home rule" cities in matters of public,
as distinguished from matters of local, nature.-Judgment reversed with
instructions.
IRRIGATION DISTRICTS-DISSOLUTION-BoNDS-INTEREST AFTER MATURI-
TY-Clint 0. Heath vs. The Green City Irrigation District-No. 12839-
Decided June 20, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. Where the owner of irrigation bonds was tendered by the County
Treasurer of Weld County, the full face value of his bonds, with interest
thereon, to maturity, he is not in a position to question the validity of a dis-
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solution decree of the District Court in which all the other creditors of the
District who were parties to this proceeding, have acquiesced.
2. The bondholder is not entitled to interest upon the same after
maturity or interest upon the attached coupons which accrued thereafter.-
Judgment affirmed.
NOTES-IINDIVIDUAL LIABILITY OF OFFICER-MISREPRESENTATION Evi-
DENCE-Hollis vs. Commercial National Bank-No. 12714-Decided
June 20, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
1. In an action on a note by the bank against the president of a Com-
pany in his individual capacity, alleging misrepresentation, and where the only
evidence of misrepresentation is a letter that was not produced at the trial,
held error to introduce secondary evidence, without first showing that the
letter was directed to the bank; that the president of the bank, in whose
custody the letter was given, could not be found; or that any effort was made
to find him, what he knew or what disposition was made of the letter.-
Judgment reversed and remanded.
LIFE INSURANCE-AMBIGUITY OF TERMS OF POLICY-CONSTRUCTION-
Shinall vs. Prudential Insurance Co.-No. 12776-Decided June 20, 1932
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
The date of the policy and the date for payment of annual premiums
was March 21. The first premium was not paid until April 21st. The
insured allowed the next annual premium, supposedly due March 21, to lapse,
and died June 4th. The insurance company contended that the sixty days
of grace had expired before the death of the insured. The application, which
constituted a part of the contract, provided that the policy should not take
effect until payment of the premium, whereas the policy was dated approxi-
mately one month prior to such payment. The grace clause recited: "If
this policy after being in force one full year from its date shall lapse for non-
payment of premium, the company will continue in force the insurance . . .
for a period of sixty days from the due date of such premium." The question
was whether the policy came into force on March 21 or on April 20, and, if
not until the latter date, whether or not it could be said to have lapsed before
April 20th of the ensuing year.
Held: 1. The terms of the policy were ambiguous as to the time
when the policy came into force, and, consequently, were ambiguous concern-
ing whether or not it had been in force for one full year prior to March 21,
the date for payment of the premium.
2. Where the terms of an insurance policy are ambiguous concerning
the date on which the policy will lapse for non-payment of premium, the
ambiguity should be resolved against the insurance company as the writer of
the doubtful document.-Judgment reversed.
DICTA
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-AWARD--REIEw-Lockard vs. Industrial
Commission et al.-No. 13096-Decided June 20, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Hilliard.
No error perceived in performance by District Court of instructions
previously issued in this case by this Court. Rules of law previously stated
in Industrial Commission et al vs. Lockard, 89 Colo. 428, 3 Pac. (2d) 416;
Industrial Commission vs. Lockard, 90 Colo. 333, 9 Pac. (2d) 286, re-
affirmed.-Judgment affirmed.
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